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RECENT DECISIONS
Finally, the State Recovery Act incorporates by reference, as the
law of New York State, rules and regulations to be made in the
future by an administrative agency of the federal government.Y5  This
is contrary to the state constitution 16 and to all judicial reasoning.17
This is a two-fold fault because, in New York State, at least, it
would be unconstitutional to adopt another law in such fashion even
though that law were in existence and well defined.' 8 On two major
counts, therefore, Chapter 781, Laws of 1933, is unconstitutional
and an extremely liberal viewpoint would be required to rule other-
wise.
J C. O'C.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS--CONSTI-
TUTIONALITY OF STATUTE FORBIDDING ADVERTISING BY DENTISTS.-
Plaintiff, alleging unconstitutionality, seeks to enjoin the defendant
from enforcing a statute of the state of Oregon' which gives the
"Darweger v. Staats, 153 Misc. 522, 275 N. Y. Supp. 394 (Sup. Ct.
Broome Co., 1934), at 528:
"The Schackno Act does more than merely declare a policy and provide
means to carry it into effect. The National Industrial Recovery Act
* * * is declared to be the policy of the State of New York * * *. Codes
adopted under the National Industrial Recovery Act are made, though
not in existence, by reference those of the State of New York."
'IN. Y. CONST. art. III, §17.
' People e rel. Comm. v. Banks, 67 N. Y. 568, 575 (1876); People v.
Squire, 107 N. Y. 593, 602, 14 N. E. 820 (1888) ; Atkinson v. Hotel Pennsyl-
vania, 195 App. Div. 624, 187 N. Y. Supp. 278 (3d Dept. 1921), aff'd, 231
N. Y. 562, 132 N. E. 889; State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 121 Me. 438, 117 Atl.
588 (1922), and State v. Gauthier, 121 Me. 522, 118 Atl. 380 (1922). In People
v. Squire, supra, the court said:
"The object and intent of the constitutional provision was to prevent
statute laws relating to one subject from being made applicable to laws
passed upon another subject, through ignorance and misapprehension on
the part of the legislature, and to require that all acts should contain
within themselves such information as should be necessary to enable it
to act upon them intelligently and discreetly."
And in the De Agostina case, 155 Misc. 518, 278 N. Y. Supp. 622, cited supra
note 14, the court, in referring to the Schackno Act, said:
"It (the legislature-author) has thus accomplished the very evil sought
to be avoided by the constitutional prohibition."
It is true that in Spielmann Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, & F. Supp. 437 (S. D.
N. Y. 1934), the court held that the Schackno Act did not violate the N. Y.
STATE CONST. art. III, §17. This case, however, is not controlling on the state
courts even though it does control later federal cases. Price v. Illinois, 238
U. S. 446, 451, 35 Sup. Ct. 892 (1914) ; Des Moines Nat Bank v. Fairweather,
263 U. S. 103, 105 44 Sup. Ct. 23 (1923); Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co.,
286 U. S. 334, 52 Sup. Ct. 512 (1931).
" People ex rel. Comm. v. Banks, People v. Squire, Atkinson v. Hotel
Pennsylvania, State v. Intoxicating Liquors, and State v. Gauthier, all supra
note 17.
'Oregon Laws 1933, c. 166.
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State Board of Dental Examiners power to revoke his license to
practice dentistry. The grounds for revocation under the statute,
which defines professional misconduct, include: Advertising prices
or free dental work or guaranteeing painless dentistry; advertising
by means of large display or glaring light signs. On appeal by the
plaintiff, held, affirmed, that the statute is a valid exercise of the police
power of the state in an endeavor to guard against fraudulent adver-
tising and is neither discriminatory, arbitrary nor repugnant to the
requirements of due process, and, so being, all private contracts
become subservient to its valid exercise. Harry Semler v. Oregon
State Board of Dental Examiners, et al., - U. S. -, 55 Sup. Ct.
570 (1935).
The professions of dentistry and medicine are cloaked with a
public interest and are therefore subject to state regulation and con-
trol. 2 The state may, without being subject to the attack of discrimi-
nation, demand a diploma from a registered school as a condition
preceding the grant of a license,3 or may, without being arbitrary,
require the applicant to subject himself to an examination by an
administrative board.4  In such a profession, as in any business
closely allied to society, the property right to practice is secondary to
the general welfare of the populace,5 and the legislature may lawfully
protect against the consequences of ignorance and deception.6
The constitutional provision safeguarding contractual obligation 7
does not extend to contracts made with respect to a public business,
but they in turn become subordinate to the general welfare, and
legislation affecting such contracts is violative neither of due process,
nor of the aforementioned provision. 9 In the exercise of its police
'Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 9 Sup. Ct. 231 (1889) ; Douglas v.
Noble, 261 U. S. 165, 43 Sup. Ct. 303 (1923) ; Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U. S.
425, 428, 47 Sup. Ct. 122 (1926). "A state may, consistently with the 14th
Amendment, prescribe that only persons possessing the reasonably necessary
qualifications of learning and skill shall practice medicine or dentistry."
'Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 425. 47 Sup. Ct. 122 (1926) ; Watson v.
Maryland, 218 U. S. 173, 179, 30 Sup. Ct. 644 (1910). "A law will not be
declared discriminatory unless there is no fair reason for the law that would
not require with equal force its extension to others whom it leaves untouched."
' Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165, 43 Sup. Ct. 303 (1923).
' German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612
(1914) ; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) ; Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S.
135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921) ; Tagg Bros. v. Moorehead, 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup.
Ct. 220 (1930) ; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934).
'Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 9 Sup. Ct. 231 (1889).
'U. S. CoNST., Art. I, §10.
1U. S. CONST., AMEND. Arts. V and XIV.
'Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct.
364 (1914); Rast v. VanDeman and Lewis, 240 U. S. 342, 363, 36 Sup. Ct.
370 (1916). "If the business is subject to regulation, the contracts made in its
conduct are subject to such regulation."
Union Dry Goods v. Georgia Public Service Comm's'n, 248 U. S. 372, 375,
39 Sup. Ct. 117 (1919). "It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction
of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the state
from properly exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of
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power, the state is unhampered, save by the judicial test that the
statute must be reasonable.' 0
As in the instant case, it has been held repeatedly that it is not
unreasonable for the legislature to anticipate means, not harmful or
immoral in themselves, as leading to an unwelcome or dangerous end
and to avoid its advent by prohibitory legislation."' It is immaterial
that such legislation might affect the innocent as well as the guilty, if
it has for its end the object of safeguarding the health, safety, good
order and the morals of the community.'2
In the field of law, advertising has been curtailed to some extent
by statutes defining unprofessional conduct and providing disbarment
as a penalty.' 3  On the whole, however, statutory regulation of the
topical subject does not aim at any particular profession, and, if it
does,' 4 it does not prohibit the means chosen but rather the manner
of use.' 5 This we find exemplified in the so-called Printers' Ink
Acts 16 which do not restrict the type of medium utilized, but seek to
safeguard the public from untrue, deceptive or misleading statements
in advertisements.
H. J. O'H.
the commonweal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though
contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected."
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 52 Sup. Ct. 581 (1932). In holding
that the state has a right to limit the loads on trucks using the public highway,
the court at 391 states, "Contracts which relate to the use of the highways
must be deemed to have been made in contemplation of the regulatory authority
of the state." Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 53 Sup. Ct. 181 (1932).
1 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934). "If
the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory the requirements of due
process are satisfied."
"Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 22 Sup. Ct. 425 (1902); Otis v. Parker,
187 U. S. 606, 23 Sup. Ct. 168 (1903) ; Fisher v. St. Louis, 194 U. S. 361, 24
Sup. Ct. 673 (1904) ; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (1908) ;
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435 (1917); Purity Extract
Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 33 Sup. Ct. 44 (1912); Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248
U. S. 297, 39 Sup. Ct. 125 (1919); Pierce Oil Co. v. Hope, 248 U. S. 498,
39 Sup. Ct. 172 (1919); Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 248 U. S. 365,
47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926) ; Bloom v. Cruise, 288 U. S. 588, 53 Sup. Ct. 318 (1933).
1 Ibid.
"3It re Neuman, 169 App. Div. 638, 155 N. Y. Supp. 428 (1st Dept. 1915),
holding that advertising "Matrimonial actions a specialty" is advertising to
procure a divorce within N. Y. PENAL LAW, §120; In re Schnitzer, 33 Nev.
581, 112 Pac. 848 (1911), allowing suspension for violation of statute defining
professional misconduct; State v. Giantvalley, 123 Minn. 227, 143 N. W. 780
(1913).
1 Auctioneers must give an accurate description of the quality of jewels
put up for sale. Ala. Acts 1923. No. 522.
" Infra note 16; also Wyo. Laws 1929, c. 103 (cold storage eggs not to be
sold as fresh) ; Mich. Acts 1927, No. 112 (meat must not be falsely advertised
as kosher) ; Wis. Laws 1927, c. 230 (forbidding misrepresentation of the
nutritive qualities of bread).
10 ALA. CODE (1928) §4133; Conn. Acts (1923) c. 265; KAN. REV. STAT.
ANN. (1923) c. 21, §1112; Mich. Acts (1925) No. 319; W. VA. CODE ANN.
(Barnes, 1923) c. 145, §36; Wvo. ComP. STAT. ANN. (1920) §7302; Wis. STAT.
(1927) §§343, 413; see Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. Rzv. 945, 946.
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